This paper considers the problem of designing physical watermark signals to protect a control system against replay attacks. We first introduce the replay attack model, where an adversary replays the previous sensory data in order to fool the controller to believe the system is still operating normally. The physical watermarking scheme, which leverages a random control input as a watermark to detect the replay attack is introduced. The optimal watermark signal design problem is then proposed as an optimization problem, which achieves the optimal trade-off between the control performance and attack detection performance. For the system with unknown parameters, we provide a procedure to asymptotically derive the optimal watermarking signal. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed strategy.
, [11] , a replay attack model is defined and its effect on a steady-state control system is analyzed. An algebraic condition is provided on the detectability of the replay attack. For those systems that cannot detect replay attack efficiently, a physical watermarking scheme is proposed to enable the detection of the presence of the attack, by injecting a random control signal, namely watermark signal, into the control system. However, the watermark signal will deteriorate the control performance, and therefore it is important to find the optimal trade-off between the control performance loss and the detection performance, which can be casted as an optimization problem. Similar "watermarking" schemes are also proposed in the literature [12] , [13] , [14] .
It is worth noticing that in the majority of the aforementioned researches, the precise knowledge of the system parameters is assumed in order to design the watermarking signal. However, acquiring the parameters may be troublesome and costly. Hence, it is beneficial for the system to "learn" the parameters during its operation and automatically design the watermarking signal in real-time. Motivated by this idea, in this paper, we propose a "on-line learning mechanism" to infer the system parameters. The physical watermark that asymptotically converges to the optimal one is further developed.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II formulates the problem by introducing the system as well as the attack model. The physical watermarking scheme is introduced in Section III. In Section IV, we present an online "learning" scheme based on the input and output data to infer the parameters of the system and design the watermark signal based on the estimated parameters. We further prove the almost sure convergence of the watermarking signal to the optimal one. In Section V, numerical example is provided to verify the effectiveness of the proposed technique. Concluding remarks are given in Section VI.
Notations: A F is the Frobenius norm of an m×n matrix A defined as
is the Kronecker product of matrix A and B. A > 0 denotes that the matrix A is positive definite. A T denotes the transpose of matrix A.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we introduce the system as well as the attack model, which will be used for the remaining of the paper.
We consider a linear time-invariant system described by the following equations:
where x k ∈ R n and y k ∈ R m are the state vector and the sensor's measurement, respectively; w k ∈ R n is the zero mean Gaussian process noise with covariance Q > 0, and v k ∈ R n is the zero mean Gaussian measurement noise with covariance R > 0. We suppose that w 0 , w 1 , . . . and v 0 , v 1 , . . . are independent of each other. We further assume that x 0 is a zero mean Gaussian random vector independent of the process noise and the measurement noise, with covariance Σ.
We further make the following assumptions regarding the system:
Assumption 1: The A matrix is strictly stable. Furthermore, (A, C) is observable.
Notice that the observability assumption is without loss of generality as we can perform a Kalman decomposition and only work with the observable subspace.
Since CPS usually operates for an extended period of time, we assume that the system is already in the steady state, i.e., Σ satisfies:
Next we introduce the replay attack model. The adversary is assumed to have the following capabilities:
1) The attacker has access to all the real-time sensory data. In other words, it knows y 0 , . . . , y k at time k.
2) The attacker can modify the true sensor signals y k to arbitrary sensor signals y k . Given these capabilities, the adversary can employ the following replay attack strategy:
1) The attacker records a sequence of sensor measurements y k s from time k 1 to k 1 + T p , where T p is large enough to guarantee that the attacker can replay the sequence for an extended period of time during the attack. 2) The attacker manipulates the sensor measurements y k starting from time k 2 to the recorded signals, i.e.,
where ∆k = k 2 − k 1 . It is worth noticing that since the system is already in the steady state, the statistics of replayed y k will be exactly as the same as that of the real data y k . As a result, for a large class of linear systems, the replayed signal and the real one become indistinguishable after a short transient time period. For more detailed discussion, please refer to [9] .
III. PHYSICAL WATERMARKING SCHEME
This section is devoted to the detection of replay attack via physical watermarking. The main idea of physical watermarking is to inject a random noise φ k , which is called the watermark signal, to excite the system and check if the system responds to the watermark signal in accordance to the dynamical model of the system. To be specific, we assume that the system equation (1) is modified to be
where φ k ∈ R p is the watermark signal applied to the system at time k, which is usually assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero mean Gaussian with variance U . We further assume that (A, B) is controllable.
In the absence of attack, y k can be represented as:
For simplicity, we define
Hence, y k can be rewritten in the following form:
We further define
One can check that γ k−1 is a zero mean Gaussian whose covariance converges to U, where
Similarly, ϑ k is a zero mean Gaussian noise with covariance
. As a result, given φ 0 , . . . , φ k−1 , the conditional distribution of y k converges to a Gaussian distribution with mean γ k−1 and covariance W.
For the scenario where replay attack is present, the replayed y k can be written as
Since ∆k is unknown to the system operator, it is safe to assume that given φ 0 , . . . , φ k−1 , y k is zero mean Gaussian with covariance U + W.
As a result, we can design a detector to differentiate the distribution of y k under the following two hypotheses:
By the Neyman-Pearson lemma [15] , the Neyman-Pearson detector for hypothesis H 0 versus hypothesis H 1 takes the following form:
where η is a predetermined threshold depending on the desired false alarm rate. Otherwise, hypothesis H 0 is accepted. Similar to [10] , the quantity tr(UW −1 ) can be used to characterize the detection performance. In other words, increasing tr(UW −1 ) will usually results in better detection performance. For more details, please refer to [10] .
Note that although the watermark signal can enable the detection of replay attack, it also deteriorates the performance of the system. As a result, it is important to find the optimal trade-off between the control performance loss and the detection performance. In this paper, to quantify the performance loss, we use the following LQG metric:
where
Since y k and φ k converge to a stationary process, J can be written in analytical form as
Therefore, J is an affine function of U , which can be written as
with S being a following linear function of U ,
As a result, in order the achieve the optimal trade-off between the control performance and detection performance, we can formulate the following optimization problem:
where δ is a design parameter depending on how much control performance loss is tolerable. An important property of the optimization problem (8) is that the optimal solution is usually a rank-1 matrix, which is formalized by the following theorem:
Theorem 2: The optimization problem (8) is equivalent to
The optimal solution (not necessarily unique) to (9) is
where z is the eigenvector corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix X −1 P and z T X z = δ. Furthermore, the solution is unique if X −1 P has only one maximum eigenvalue.
Proof: From the definition of U, we know that
Following similar steps as in the above proof, we have that tr(XS) = tr(U X ). Moreover, since X > 0, we have that X > 0.
The proof of the second part is similar to the proof of Theorem 7 in [11] and is omitted here due to space limit.
It is worth noticing that in order to design the optimal watermarking signal, precise knowledge of the system parameters is needed. However, acquiring the parameters may be troublesome and costly. Therefore, it is beneficial for the system to "learn" the parameters during its operation and design the watermarking signal in real time, which will be our focus in the next section.
IV. ON-LINE "LEARNING" SCHEME
This section is devoted to developing an on-line "learning" procedure to find the optimal watermarking signals. Throughout the section, we make the following assumptions: 1) A is diagonalizable and has distinct eigenvalues.
2) The maximum eigenvalue of X −1 P is unique.
3) The system is not under attack during the "learning" phase. 4) The system output y k , the dimension of the A matrix n is known, the matrix X and δ are known. For the sake of legibility, we first introduce how to infer the necessary parameters of the system. Then we move to the design of watermark signal based on the estimated parameters. The proofs of Theorem 3, 4 and 5 are reported at the end of this section.
A. Inference on the Parameters
In this subsection, we describe our "learning" procedure. At each time k, the watermarking signal is chosen to be φ k = U 1/2 k ζ k , where ζ k s are i.i.d. Gaussian random vectors with covariance I. The matrix U k is computed as a function of y 0 , . . . , y k , φ 0 , . . . , φ k−1 , the procedure of which will be described in details in the next subsection.
Define Y k and H k,τ (0 ≤ τ ≤ 3n − 2) as
We shall assume that φ t−τ −1 = 0 if t − τ − 1 < 0.
One can think H k,τ is an estimate of H τ and Y k is an estimate of W + U. We first prove a theorem regarding the convergence H k,τ to H τ .
Theorem 3: Suppose that there exists positive definite matrices M and M , such that the following inequality surely holds:
where 0 ≤ β < 1, then H k,τ converges to H τ almost surely.
It is worth noticing that we can only keep a record of finitely many H k,τ s. However, to infer matrices U, W, P and X , we need to estimate H τ for all τ ≥ 0. The following lemma provides a method to obtain H τ from only finite parameters and its proof can be found in [16] .
Lemma 1: Suppose that the matrix A has distinct eigenvalues λ 1 , . . . , λ n , then there exists unique Ω 1 , . . . , Ω n , such that
By Lemma 1, we could use finitely many H 0 , . . . , H 3n−2 to estimate both λ i s and Ω i s and thus H τ for any τ . To this end, let us consider the following optimization problem:
where H k is a Hankel matrix defined as Let us denote the roots of the polynomial p k (x) = x n + α k,n−1 x n−1 + . . . + α k,0 to be λ k,1 , . . . , λ k,n . Define a Vandermonde like matrix V k to be
The following theorem further establishes the convergence of λ k,i (and Ω k,i ) to λ i (and Ω i ):
Theorem 4: Suppose that A has distinct eigenvalues. If H k,τ converges to H τ for 0 ≤ τ ≤ 3n − 2, then λ k,i converges λ i and Ω k,i converges to Ω i . Then let us define U k,ij , which satisfies the following recursive equation:
The following theorem establishes the convergence of W k : Theorem 5: Suppose that (12) holds, then W k converges to W almost surely. Let us further define
By the convergence of H k,τ , W k , λ k,i and Ω k,i , it is easy to prove that P k and X k converges to P and X almost surely. As a result, we have successfully estimated all the parameters necessary to design the watermarking signal, with the only assumption being (12) .
B. Watermarking Signal Design
U k is updated as
where δ is defined in (8) and U k, * is the solution of the following optimization problem
The following theorem establishes the boundedness and convergence of U k . Theorem 6: U k is bounded by
Furthermore, if P k converges to P and X k converges to X , then
where U is the solution of (14) .
Proof: Notice that
Hence, X k ≥ X φφ − X φy X −1 yy X yφ , which implies that tr(U k, * X φφ − X φy X −1 yy X yφ ) ≤ δ.
Notice that if for a positive semidefinite X with tr(X) ≤ δ, then X ≤ δI. Hence, (17) implies that
which proves the first inequality in (16) . The second inequality can be easily proved by (15) . The convergence can be proved by noticing that U k, * is a continuous function of P k , X k at a neighborhood of P, X . The detailed proof is omitted due to space limit. Now we can establish that U k converges to the optimal U . Notice that there is no circular logic in our proof, as (16) holds regardless of the inferred value Y k and H k,τ . Therefore, the convergence of X k and P k is guaranteed by Theorem 3, 4 and 5, which further implies the convergence of U k .
C. Proofs of Theorem 3, 4 and 5 1) Proof of Theorem 3: We only prove for the case where τ = 0. The τ > 0 case can be proved following similar arguments and the details are omitted due to space constraints. Before proving theorem 3, the following lemmas are needed and their proofs can be found in [16] .
Lemma 2: Suppose that ω, υ, ς, ξ are four jointly Gaussian random vectors with zero mean and proper dimensions. The following equations are true:
where Π k (k = 0, · · · , n) and Υ n are all m × l matrices, then lim n→∞ Υ n n + 1 = 0 almost surely. Proof: [Proof of Theorem 3] We only provide an outline of the proof. The detailed proof can be found in [16] . Define the filtration F k to be the σ-algebra which is generated by the following random variables {x 0 , φ 0 , . . . , φ k−1 , w 0 , . . . , w k−1 , v 0 , . . . , v k }. It is easy to see that both U k and y k are measurable in the σ-algebra F k . Let us further define
The proof is divided into steps. First, one can prove that S k is a martingale with respect to the filtration {F k }, i.e.,
or in other words,
Next we need to prove that
Let us consider
Now by Lemma 2, we can prove that
Since β < 1, according to the convergence condition of infinite series, we know that the infinite sum on LHS of (19) is bounded. Therefore, by Lemma 3,
which proves that H k,0 converges to H 0 almost surely.
2) Proof of Theorem 4: Before proving Theorem 4, we need the following lemma, whose proof can be found in [16] .
Lemma 4: Suppose that the vector ϕ is the solution of the optimization problem
where A(θ) and b(θ) are continuous functions of θ. If A(θ 0 ) is of full column rank at θ 0 , then ϕ is unique and a continuous function of θ in a neighborhood of θ 0 .
The proof of Theorem 4 can be proved by Lemma 1 and Lemma 4. The details can be found in [16] .
3) Proof of Theorem 5: Before proving the theorem, we need the following lemma, whose proof can be found in [16] .
Lemma 5: Suppose that ρ k converges to ρ, where |ρ| < 1. Furthermore, assume that lim k→∞ a k − a k = 0, where a k is a bounded sequence. Then we have
where b k and b k satisfy the following recursive equation:
with initial condition b −1 = b −1 = 0. The proof of Theorem 5 can be proved by Lemma 1, Lemma 5 and Theorem 6 in [17] . The detailed proof can be found in [16] .
V. SIMULATION RESULT
In this section, the performance of the proposed learning procedure is evaluated. We choose n = m = p = 2 and A, B, C are all randomly generated, with A stable.
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that X in (7), the covariance matrices Q and R are equal to the identity matrix with proper dimensions. We assume that δ in (9) is equal to 5 and β = 1/3. Figure 1 shows U k − U F / U v.s. time k, where U is the solution of the optimization problem of (8), and U k , generated through updating equation (15) , is the estimation of U . From Figure 1 , it can be seen that U k converges to the optimal U as time goes to infinity. Furthermore, the convergence follows a power law, i.e., U k −U F = O(k − ). We plan to investigate the rate of the convergence in our future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the detection problem of replay attack via "physical watermarking" with known system parameters is proposed to achieve the desired trade-off between the detection performance and control performance loss. Then we provide an on-line "learning" technique for determining the optimal watermarking signals without the knowledge of system parameters. The simulation is carried out to verify the effectiveness of the proposed technique.
